Subject: report of action during period 11 April 1945 to 2 May 1945
To: ARMY GROUND FORCES BOARDS, MTOUSA
Florence Area Allied Command
APO 777, U.S. Army
1. In compliance with letter, Army ground Forces Board, MTOUSA, subject, "Report of action during Period 14 april 45 to date, "4 May 45, the following is submitted:
2. This battalion's combat against the enemy in the last offensive began in the Eight Army sector 11 April. Attached is a copy of a report on the two amphibious operations, on 11 and 13 April 1945.
3. The remainder of the report covers the re-equipping of the Battalion after finishing amphibious operations from an amphibious regiment into a tank battalion, and subsequent tank action in the PO VALLEY:
4. Following completion of two amphibious operations, the 755th Tank Battalion, with the exception of company C and elements of the Headquarters and Service Companies was at M-506536, north of RAVENNA. The other companies remained at LAKE TRASIMENE (W400960). Latter companies moved to vicinity PRATO, near FLORENCE, on 17 April. Companies A, B, C, and elements of Headquarters and Service Companies moved to same area on 19 April. The entire Battalion went under command of the Fifth Army again, and began preparations for re-equipping as a tank battalion.
Between 19 and 22 April, we drew fifteen (15) 17 pounders M4 tank seventeen (17) M4A3's and seventeen M4's. Seventeen (17) M-24 Light tanks were drawn on 20 and 21 APril, and assigned to D
company
The Battalion spent 20, 21, 22 April preparing new equipment, installing radios, firing some of the weapons before we would have to move up..
On 23 April, Company C detached 40 men to 175 Engineer Battalion to operate Fantails (LVT's) in the crossing of the PO
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RIVER. Also on this date, 27 tanks of Headquarters and A companies left by transporters for MODENA area. Fifty (50) enlisted men were received as replacement pool for the Battalion.
Headquarters and A companies moved from PRATO on 24 April to RUBIERA where the 755th Tank Battalion was attached upon arrival to VI Corps for employment with the 31th Infantry Division. 1st Platoon of company A, in support of the 133 Infantry moved on REGGIO, astride Hwy. 9, Where the infantry of the 133 were held up by determined resistance which included some German tanks or SP guns. Company A's second platoon moved out at 1900B in support of the 34th Reconnaissance Troop with the mission of protecting the division left flank The third platoon, moved out at 1940b in support of the 168th infantry vicinity BAGNOLEO. Thus the entire company was committed to battle as it arrived by transporter from FLORENCE area. When one platoon arrived , it was pushed off to fight, so urgent was the 43th division need for tanks. Previously, the Division had none in its PO VALLEY operations, which, of course, had just begun, Service Company moved to RUBIERA this date.
24 April, eight tanks of B company arrived area S. ILARIO, on Highway 9. They were immediately put in support of 168th infantry, whose mission was to attack astride Hwy. ( to ward PARMA. All infantry and tank movement during these operation were very rapid, outstripping supplies and communications briefly, and meeting surprisingly light resistance. Strong points would be encountered along Highway 9 by-passed, then cleaned up later. The advance was so rapid when once the infantry got tank support it could almost be described as pell-mell. Close support of the infantry was the mission of the tanks, Ten or twenty infantrymen would ride each tank, until fired upon, then get off and disperse. The tanks and infantry would clean out the position, infantry mount up, and the advance would continue, Perfect tank-infantry teamwork.
On the 25th April, 2nd platoon of Company A, supporting 133 Infantry Regiment, Established road blocks along main advance alone Hwy. 9, the third platoon of Company A was attached to company B. the 1st platoon of Company B supported 168 Infantry attack on PARMA, while the 2nd platoon by-passed PARMA to the south. The Battalion, less one platoon of Company A Company C, and Company D, were put in support of the 135th Infantry.
26 April, Company A, supporting the attack of the 135 Infantry advanced on PIACENZA. Resistance was encountered in entering town. one platoon of Company A remained in support of the 34th Recon Troop. The 1st platoon of Company B, in support
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of 168 INfantry Regiment, encountered and destroyed a truck convoy and took prisoners. Two platoons of Company B were supporting 133 Infantry and obtained their objective at BUSSETO. They knocked out three tanks of the enemy and destroyed personnel. Company D arrived from FLORENCE area complete, and were Immediately assigned to establishing moving patrols between PARMA and FIRENZUOLA with contact point of FIDENZA.. More than 9,000 Germans had been reported coming out of the Mountains on our left. To prevent them from trying to cross Highway 9, and escape to the north across the PO, in addition to protecting the Division's unprotected left flank, the tanks were put on patrol. The Battalion CP was in FIDENZA at this time, and maintained radio contact with the patrols.
27 April, Company A with one platoon of Company B and 105 How. Assault Gun section attached, was in support of the 135 Infantry on road blocking operations. Company B, less one platoon, was in support of the 133 Infantry. Company C was assembling. Company D, less two platoons, was in support of the 168 Infantry. The other platoon of Company D remained in division reserve. Company D engaged the enemy vicinity MEDESANO andcaptured 50. A and B company tanks executed a pincers movement on an enemy pocket in grid square 80-10, D Company lost one tank to an 88mm ap. No casuslties, however, one platoon of Company D, in support of 168 Infantry, took 700-1000 prisoners. Heavy resistance, including self-propelled enemy artillery, was encountered. We made use of his single attached 17 pounder.
@8 April, the Battalion was ordered to assemble and prepare to move to an assembly area at BOZOLO. Plane were that we would fight up Highway 10. Company C and D and Battalion CP left FIDENZA for BOZOLO at 1600. At midnight, our march units were intercepted on the road with a change of orders to move to MONTECHIARI.
29 April, the Battalion was engaged in moving to MONTECHIARI. Companies C, D, and Headquarters closed at 0930b at destination, having made an all night march of 105 milers. The Division mission was a again one of mopping up -- around BERGAMO.
30 April, one platoon of C and one platoon of D Companies moved out in the middle of the night, assigned as guard of IV Hqs. Company B also moved out at 1400b, in support of 133 infantry. The battalion, less A and B Companies, Moved from MONTECHIARI to vicinity of BERGAMO. Company A formed road blocks for 135 Infantry, moving with Infantry to vicinity GALLARATE (J950875). Company B operated with 133 Infantry and formed road blocks, moving to BUSTO GAROFO (K010745).
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1 May, the Battalion, Less COmpanies A and B, left J651842 and moved to J950865. Company B moved with 133 Infantry to J995722. Company D, Less one platoon, was put in support of 34th Rec Troop and moved to J618679. Company C insupport of 168 Infantry . Regiment, moved along Autostrada with greatest speed to vicinity of LA MARCHESA (5068).
2 May , Companies A and C supporting road blocks of 135 and 168 Infantry Regiments respectively. Division troops all concentrated in area around BIELLA (j3761) and J487659. Forty Thousand Germans wee in this area, and the Division plus attachments, was engaged in working out details of the surrender, and removal of German troops to prisoner of war cages. Therefor, the principal function of the tanks at this time ws one of the road blocking, and standing by for any eventually. Company B and one platoon of Company D were in division reserve.
3 May, Company A continued in support of the 135 Infantry. Company B supporting 133 INfantry, left vicinity J618679 for GALLARATE. Company D in support of 34th Recon Troop moved to COMO, for guard and patrol, Italian-Swiss Border.
Since this date, the chief operations of the Division and the 755th Tank Battalion has been one of watching, patrolling, and removal of prisoners of war.
5. Comments on the PO VALLEY Campaign:
A. Tank radios have insufficient range for proper control by companies or battalion in a rapidly moving situation or when spread out over a divisional sector. During the past campaign, the only radios of value in maintaining communications were the 193 radios. One was with the 34th Infantry Division CP, one with Battalion Hq and one at Service Company. The 500 series were out of range most of the time and so therefore most communications from battalion to companies were by messengers or staff officers in 1/4 tons. Each company headquarters should have a 193 set or a 245 in a half track, M8 or M20 armored car, or light tank. M24 light makes a very good command tank when available. Much information of value to Infantry Division Hq would be made available hours earlier if good communications were available and much time was lost in sending messengers 20 or 30 miles in darkness, through territory not cleared of the enemy, to locate a company whose location was not definitely known. Adequate radios would have facilitated operations not only for tanks but also for the supported
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infantry division. It is obvious that radios are out of range 75% of the time are valueless all the time.
B. The M4A3 tank with 76mm or 105mm is definitely a much superior tank than the M4 or M4A1 and crews are unanimous in their praise. The 76mm gun in much more effective on all heavy installations and against armor. The M4A3 with 105mm How. and wide steel tracks and all around vision cupola is especially good. The rolled armor plate on one of these took two hits of 75mm at about 60* from normal impact and defected both from the front plate. Range was about 200 yards. The same enemy gun knocked out one M4 tank. The 105mm after being hit twice, destroyed the enemy gun. Lack of power traverse on this tank is a definite disadvantage. This tank should be used in close support or with the assault platoons, for its much greater destructive effect is useful against house, road blocks, or concrete blockhouses. If it is needed for high angle fire it can drop back to a more desirable position.
C. Especially praiseworthy is the remarkable manner in which army and Division supply installations kept pace with operational requirements. Dumps were kept well forward and well supplied. Great improvement was noted over previous campaigns. Gasoline consumption was especially heavy during
this time.
D. Ready racks for cannon ammunition should be provided in both 105mm and 76mm (M4A3 tanks). Present racks for 76mm accommodate only AP and should be modified to take at least 2 rounds of HE. 105mm M4A3 tanks have no ready racks.
E. Infantry of the 34th Division worked extremely well with the tanks. Tank platoon leaders and company commanders were unanimous in their infantry support.
/s/Herbert B.. Fowler
/t/Herbert B. Fowler
Major, 755th Tank Battalion,
Commanding
Reproduced by:
Headquarters Army Ground Forces
Fort Monroe, Va.
30 October 1946
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